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Abstract 
We propose an underrecognized measure to capture changes in firm risk from information 
technology (IT) announcements: implied volatility (IV) from a firm’s exchange-traded options. An 
IV is obtained from a priced stock option and represents the option market’s expectation of the firm’s 
average stock return volatility over the remaining duration of the option. Using the change in IV 
around IT announcements, we can directly assess changes in IT-induced firm risk. IVs are 
straightforward to obtain, and are forward-looking based on option market investors’ estimates of 
future stock return volatility. They do not rely on historical volatility that is confounded with other 
events. In addition, options have different expiration dates—each with an IV—allowing us to 
distinguish between short- and long-term risk. We show how a change in IV can be employed to 
assess changes in short- and long-term firm risk from IT announcements and demonstrate this 
methodological innovation empirically using a set of IT announcements that have been utilized in 
previous studies. 
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1 Introduction 
Risky choices are hard to gauge, and few choices affect 
firms’ risk more than new information technology (IT) 
initiatives. As IT continues to be a major driving force 
for innovation, productivity, and economic growth, IT 
projects are becoming increasingly complex and IT 
capabilities are often difficult to build and manage. 
According to an IBM study, nearly 60% of IT projects 
do not meet schedule, budget, and quality goals 
(Jorgensen, Owen, & Neus, 2008). A more recent 
survey shows that more than 50% of firms had an IT 
project that failed during the  previous year (Innotas, 
2013). 
Adopting the definition for IT risk from Dewan, Shi, 
and Gurbaxani (2007), “the ex-ante uncertainty 
associated with IT returns” (p. 1829), we propose an 
important and underrecognized measure of firm risk 
that allows researchers to explore the relationship 
between IT investments and both short- and long-term 
firm risk. Implied volatility (IV) of a firm’s exchange-
traded options is a unique measure of firm risk that can 
be used to study changes that result from specific 
events. IV is obtained from a priced stock option and 
represents the option market’s expectation of the 
underlying firm’s average stock return volatility over 
the remaining duration of the option contract (Merton, 
1973; Donders & Vorst, 1996). Thus, by  construction, 
IV is the expected uncertainty about the underlying 
firm value by the market (Rogers, Douglas, & Van 
Buskirk, 2009). 
The IS discipline has long been interested in 
information systems-related risks such as user- 
perceived risk (e.g., Pavlou & Gefen, 2004; Nicolaou 
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& McKnight, 2006), investor perceived risk (e.g., 
Dewan & Ren, 2007; Kim, Mithas, & Kimbrough, 
2017), security risk (e.g., Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 
1992), IT project risk (e.g., Alter & Ginzberg, 1978; 
Kwon, 1987; Benaroch, 2002), software risk (e.g., 
Charette, 1989; Boehm, 1991; Fairley, 1994; Tian & 
Xu, 2015), and business process risk (e.g., Kettinger, 
Teng, & Guha, 1997; Kliem, 2000). By design, these 
risk measures are at the user level, project level, 
business process level, etc.  
Assessing changes in firm risk from IT is difficult. 
Prior work is equivocal about whether IT investment 
announcements (hereafter “IT announcements”) or 
planned IT investments should decrease or increase 
firm risk and is silent regarding their short- versus 
long-term effects on firm risk. On the one hand, IT 
enhances information processing and thus enables 
firms to better respond to demand and task 
uncertainties (Galbraith, 1974); on the other hand, IT 
assets are inherently risky to build and manage (Wang 
& Alam, 2007). 
An example of IT’s complex impact on firm-level risk 
is investments in digitally controlled machines in 
manufacturing. These machines can easily produce 
related but different products, whereas nondigital 
machines are more limited in scope or have large 
changeover costs. Digitally controlled machines can 
switch between products at low cost, based on demand 
fluctuations, making the firm more agile and reducing 
the uncertainty of future cash flows, thus reducing firm 
risk. On the other hand, to make the best use of 
digitally controlled machines, they must be integrated 
into the existing production environment, may 
necessitate the redesign of existing business processes, 
and require training, all of which increase firm risk. 
Employed as the expected uncertainty about 
underlying firm value, IV as a measure of IT-induced 
firm risk has three advantages. First, it is forward 
looking and market driven. As IV is derived from the 
price of a traded option, it is based on option market 
investors’ estimates of future stock return volatility. In 
other words, it is risk that is perceived about a firm’s 
future on a particular date by investors. Thus, IV is a 
market-derived consensus from a set of experts based 
on their future expectations. 
Second, being derived from the option price means that 
IV does not directly rely on historical stock price 
volatility, the alternative market-based measure of risk. 
In practice, this means that measuring changes in IV 
does not require accounting for the variety of historical 
events and past economic and market trends that are 
required when measuring effects on historical stock 
price volatility. 
Third, option contracts have different expiration dates, 
and each option with a specific expiration date has a 
market price and, consequently, its own IV. This 
provides a term structure of IVs. For a given firm, 
changes in IV for options based on the given firm’s 
stock price with specific expiration dates—ranging 
from 30, 60, 91, 182, 365, 547 to 730 calendar days—
allow IVs to be used to assess changes in firm risk 
across these different time horizons. Measuring 
changes in firm risk from IT investment is a relatively 
unresolved issue with only a few studies (e.g., Dewan 
& Ren, 2007, 2011; Kim et al., 2017) measuring firm 
risk changes from IT investments. 
Indeed, predicting IT returns is notoriously difficult 
because technologies change quickly, there is tension 
between IT changing business processes and vice-
versa, and the effects of IT investments are often 
intangible (Brynjolfsson & Yang, 1997). 
Consequently, we argue that IV is an especially good 
fit for measuring IT-induced firm risk because it is a 
forward-looking, market-based measure that captures 
the collective assessment of a large number of 
investors concerning uncertainty about future firm 
performance over different time periods that is 
attributable to the IT events. Thus, it avoids the 
disadvantages of using a particular analytic method to 
evaluate the risks of such IT investments. 
Our goal in highlighting IV as an important and 
underrecognized measure of firm risk is to propose and 
explain the advantages of using IV to measure firm 
risk. Through an illustrative study of IT 
announcements, we demonstrate the advantages of 
using IV to assess the effects on firm risk, thus 
establishing the use of measuring changes in IV as a 
standard method of studying changes in firm risk from 
IT initiatives. To begin, we fully define IV, explain the 
relationship between IV and firm risk, briefly cover 
relevant research in other disciplines using IV, and 
then detail the advantages of using IV as a risk 
measure. Next, we examine prior research in 
information systems that studies firm risk attributable 
to IT investments, indicating where the use of IV may 
yield critical insights. 
We demonstrate how IV and its use may provide a 
measurement approach that can easily be used by 
others. Using methods from accounting and finance, 
we show how to formulate an analysis to examine and 
test for changes in IV, and how to set up a regression 
on IV that incorporates market effects and adds a 
variety of controls. Subsequently, we implement these 
methods using a dataset of IT announcements from 
Dewan and Ren (Dewan & Ren, 2007). With this 
previously published dataset, we describe how IVs are 
obtained, execute an event study that determines 
changes in firm risk overall and in various dimensions, 
and carry out a regression on IV with a variety of 
controls. Through this process, we show how changes 
in IV can be measured, compare this to alternatives, 
describe how straightforward it is to obtain, and 
illustrate its usefulness in practice (estimate risk) and 
research (see above). Our findings reveal that IV as a 
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measure of firm risk could also be used as an 
independent variable in other studies. 
Using these advantages of IV we also provide novel 
results. We show that IT announcements significantly 
increase firm risk between 1% and 3%, depending on 
the expiration length of the option. Firms that only 
have traded options with expiration lengths of 182 days 
or less have increased firm risk on the order of 2% to 
4%, as a result of IT announcements. In contrast, firms 
that have traded options with expiration dates of up to 
two years do not have increased risk. Firm size is 
negatively associated with IT announcements’ impact 
on firm risk: IT announcements made by smaller firms 
significantly increase firm risk, likely because smaller 
firms are more subject to changes brought about by 
new IT initiatives. A “good” news announcement is an 
event for which the actual stock return is more than the 
expected stock return upon the information being 
released; and a “bad” news announcement is one where 
the actual stock return for the underlying firm is less 
than the expected stock return. We find that bad news 
IT announcements are associated with significantly 
higher firm risk, whereas good news IT 
announcements have no effect. This may be because 
bad news announcements are more surprising to 
investors, given that firms have incentives to withhold 
bad news (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009). Finally, 
IVs show significantly less risk than actual volatility in 
stock price after the announcement day, indicating the 
degree to which other events affect stock volatility, and 
suggesting that use of historical stock volatility to 
predict risk from IT announcements is challenged by 
the need to control for other effects. 
Our results are consistent with studies that use either 
the standard deviation of historical earnings or 
historical stock return volatility as a measure of risk 
that find that IT investments typically increase firm 
risk (Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998; Kothari, Laguerre, 
& Leone, 2002; Agrawal, Bharath, & Viswanathan, 
2003; Fornell, Mithas, Morgeson, & Krishnan, 2006; 
Dewan et al., 2007; Dewan and Ren, 2011). Our paper 
highlights the key advantages of IVs: IVs are ex ante, 
are available daily without the need to account for past 
events, and assess risk over different terms. Using the 
latter, we find novel results showing that increases in 
risk are shorter-term. To the degree that enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) systems can reduce risk and 
given that other applications, such as automation, are 
relatively less risky, our good/bad news results are 
consistent with Tian and Xu (2015) and Kim et al. 
(2017), and maintain the advantages described above 
over their measures. 
2 IV, Firm Risk, and IT Risk 
2 . 1  Implied Volatility (IV)  
A stock option is a contract between a buyer and a seller. 
A call option gives the buyer the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy shares of an underlying stock at an 
agreed-upon price from the seller within a certain period 
of time. The agreed-upon price is called the strike price 
or the exercise price, and the end of the certain period of 
time is called the expiration date or maturity date. A put 
option is simply the reverse: the buyer has the right, but 
not the obligation, to sell shares of an underlying stock 
at the strike price to the seller by the expiration date. A 
buyer exercising its right is said to have exercised the 
option. The difference between an American option and 
a European option is that the latter can only be exercised 
on its expiration/maturity date. 
Theoretically, IV is derived from an option pricing 
model, such as the Black-Scholes model when we know 
the market price of the option, the time to expiration, the 
current (spot) price of the underlying stock, the strike 
price, and the risk-free rate. Thus, the IV is implied by 
the option pricing model equation together with the 
other known variables. It represents the market’s 
expectation of the volatility of returns for the underlying 
stock over the remaining life of the option (Merton, 
1973; Donders & Vorst, 1996). For options traders, their 
estimates of the volatility of returns for the underlying 
stock until option expiration is effectively their private 
information about firm risk. When options are traded on 
the options exchange, the equilibrium price of the option 
reflects the aggregate market knowledge about firm risk 
and this is captured by the IV of the priced option. 
IV has been recognized and adopted as a measure of 
firm risk in many finance and accounting studies. 
Theoretically, the IV of an option is the expected 
average volatility over the remaining life of the option 
(Merton, 1973; Heynen, Kemma, & Vorst, 1994). This 
is why prices—and, consequently, IVs—differ for 
options whose only difference is time to maturity. 
Comparing IV with historical volatility, Mayhew (1995) 
asserts in a general conclusion drawn from a large body 
of literature that IV tends to be more useful than 
historical data for forecasting volatility. In his Nobel 
lecture, Robert C. Merton indicated that the Federal 
Reserve uses the IV derived from option prices on 
government bonds as one of its indicators of investor 
uncertainty about the future course of interest rates 
(Merton, 1988). Rogers et al. (2009) state that an IV “is 
an ex ante measure of volatility that allows us to study 
how volatility changes over short periods around 
information releases. Realized volatilities must be 
estimated using a time series of returns so reflect 
changes in uncertainty gradually over time” (p. 94). 
Figure 1 shows the forward-looking IV versus historical 
volatility. 




Figure 1. IV vs. Historical Volatility 
 
2.2 Advantages of IV as a Measure of 
Firm Risk from IT Initiatives 
IV as a measure of IT-induced firm risk has three 
advantages over other measures, such as the historical 
volatility of stock returns. First, risk in the 
management literature has always had an ex ante 
nature. Tracing back to Knight (1921), situations with 
risk are those where the outcomes are unknown but 
governed by probability distributions known at the 
outset. This is distinct from situations where the 
probability distributions are not known, in which case, 
the issue is how to estimate the probability distribution. 
This connects with classical decision theory that 
conceptualizes the risk of a decision alternative in 
terms of variation in possible outcomes, in their 
likelihoods as well as their subjective values (Arrow, 
1965). Thus, secondary data and/or subjective 
assessments can be used to estimate probabilities over 
outcomes. IV can be best understood as a measure of 
risk in which the probabilities over future outcomes are 
known and, in some cases, where the probabilities over 
future outcomes are not common knowledge 
(unknown) but can be estimated. What IVs do not 
measure is unidentified risks, so-called unknown 
unknowns or unknowable uncertainties, in which 
certain outcomes are not identifiable, i.e., missing 
information is unavailable to all (Chow & Sarin, 2002; 
Kim, 2012). 
Taken at a point in time, risk is the uncertainty about 
future outcomes. Contrary to the common 
understanding that risk is only about bad outcomes, 
risk can also be the downward or upward variation in 
expected outcomes. Broadly speaking, risk has been 
defined along four dimensions: size of loss, probability 
of loss, variance of returns, and lack of information 
(Tanriverdi & Ruefli, 2004). In the context of a firm, 
risk is the volatility of future stock returns that is driven 
by uncertainty about firm investment decisions and 
how these decisions will affect firm profitability. IV, 
by design, is the market’s equilibrium expectation 
about future return volatility of the underlying stock, 
with the market equilibrium reflecting all available 
information. Therefore, IV is an ex ante measure of 
future return volatility and is thus a natural measure for 
assessing changes in firm risk from decisions that 
contribute to future stock returns. Ex ante measures of 
firm risk are preferable to ex post measures because 
firms make decisions based on their expectation of 
future uncertainties, and ex post measures expect that 
future opportunities a firm will face and decisions a 
firm makes will mirror past decisions (Silhan & 
Thomas, 1986; Bromiley, 1991). In the IS literature, 
Dewan and Ren (2011) describe the advantages of ex 
ante risk measures:  
Ex ante measure of firm risk reflects the 
prior assessments of anticipated 
uncertainty of a firm’s earnings stream, 
which is a better reflection of the actual 
decisions faced by the firm or its managers, 
as opposed to the realized variability of 
returns captured by the ex post measures 
such as variability of returns (p. 377). 
As described above, considerable research in finance 
and accounting uses IV as an ex ante measure of firm 
risk. 
Second, IV is a measure that is available daily, and can 
even be computed dynamically during the day as the 
price of options change. As such, IV is a forward-
looking firm risk measure that allows for the 
estimation of changes in firm risk immediately after 
events such as announcements of future investments, 
the release of periodic financial information, or other 
information that affect assessments of firm risk. Thus, 
IV can change dynamically with the release of new 
information. 
In contrast, historical stock return volatility has to be 
measured over a period of time that usually ranges 
from one month to several years. One issue with 
historical stock return volatility—beyond the fact that 
it reflects past opportunities and decisions, as 
described above—is the challenge of controlling for all 
confounding and unobservable factors that affect firm 
risk during this period. In other words, drawing a 
causal relationship between the event and a subsequent 
change in risk measured by historical volatilities 
requires ruling out alternative explanations from 
historical events. Changes in IV can measure the 
change in firm risk over relatively short intervals 
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around information releases, which minimizes the 
possibility that the change in firm risk is caused by 
unobservable or historical factors. Therefore, IV is a 
natural risk measure for an IT-event study.  
Third, firms may offer option contracts with different 
expiration dates ranging from 30 days to 730 days. 
Each option has its own expiration date and its own 
market price and, consequently, its own IV. Thus, IV 
has a term structure by design—i.e., time until 
expiration. Therefore, IV offers unique insights on 
investors’ ex ante perceptions of changes in firm risk 
over different time horizons resulting from new 
information. Although historical stock return volatility 
could also be measured over different past time 
horizons, it is an ex post measure and thus does not 
reveal the “real” change in investors’ perceptions 
about changes in firm risk after an event. 
Recalling that IV is a measure that reflects the average 
volatility over the life of the option, the term structure 
constructed by different option contracts with different 
expiration dates makes it possible to observe whether 
information releases such as IT announcements result 
in increased short-term risk, relative to long-term 
risk—the term structure of changes in risk. In addition 
to pooled sets of IVs from options of different lengths, 
it is possible to examine the term structure of changes 
in risk for specific firms in a matched sample analysis 
of firms with option contracts of different lengths. This 
is not possible when using historical volatility. 
Although it is not one of the three advantages that we 
focus on, there are arguments that IV is a relatively 
better measure with less anticipated events. Jin, Livnat, 
and Zhang (2012) argue that, “relative to equity 
traders, option traders have superior ability to process 
less anticipated information” (p. 402). Unlike routine 
events such as earnings announcements, IT 
announcements are usually not scheduled events. 
Moreover, with many firms in a given sample, it is hard 
to imagine that these firms consistently schedule their 
IT announcements. Therefore, we believe that changes 
in IV are a better measurement of changes in future 
firm risk than any of the equity-market based 
measures, such as historical stock volatility. 
2.3 Relationship with Prior IS 
Research  
The benefits of our proposed measure are critically 
important when considering research in the IS 
literature that studies IT-induced changes in firm risk. 
Almost all of these studies measure firm risk as 
variants of historical volatilities. Two different 
measures for risk are adopted by Carter et al. (1998) 
and Kothari et al. (2002) respectively: the standard 
deviation of one-year daily stock returns following the 
investment, and the standard deviation of realized 
annual earnings over five years following the 
investment—both ex post firm risk measures. They 
show that IT capital investments make a substantially 
larger contribution to firm risk than non-IT capital 
investments. Dewan et al. (2007) measure IT risk as 
the variability of returns on IT investment, which is 
increased by unexpected positive or negative 
outcomes. They define systematic risk as the change in 
total firm risk that can be explained by change in 
market variance and unsystematic risk as idiosyncratic 
firm risk. By analyzing abnormal trading activities 
around IT investment announcements, they find that 
both total and unsystematic risk show a significant 
post-event increase in 1998 and 2000, whereas 
systematic risk adjusts downward in 1996 and 2002. 
Tian and Xu (2015) use historical earnings volatility as 
a proxy for firm risk and find that ERP systems can 
help reduce firm risk. The risk reduction effect 
becomes greater when firms operate in more uncertain 
environments. Kim et al. (2017) study the impact of IT 
investments on firm risk measured as initial bond 
ratings and yield spreads. They find that IT 
investments are associated with less risk in automate 
and informate industries than in transform industries. 
An unpublished working paper by Agrawal et al. 
(2003) examines changes in firm risk arising from e-
commerce announcements by traditional “brick-and-
mortar” firms. Using changes in a firm’s historical 
stock return volatility, they find that both idiosyncratic 
and total volatility significantly increase after 
announcement events. IV is used in one of the 
robustness tests to reinforce their historical volatility 
findings. Consequently, the advantages of IVs that we 
detail above were not exploited. 
Fornell et al. (2006) find that investment 
announcements about customer relationship 
management (CRM) are associated with lower 
historical stock volatility. Using cross-sectional time 
series regressions, Dewan and Ren (2011) estimate the 
impact of accumulated IT capital stock on firm returns 
and firm risk and adopt two alternative risk measures: 
historical variability of stock returns and variability of 
analysts’ annual earnings per share estimates, the latter 
being an ex ante (albeit subjective rather than market-
driven) measure of firm risk. They discover that IT 
capital stock is associated with an increase in both risk 
measures, but the study does not examine changes in 
firm risk from individual IT-related events. 
2.4 Relationship with Prior Finance 
and Accounting Research  
Following prior literature in finance and accounting, 
we use an event study-approach to study the effects of 
IT investment on firm risk. Levy and Yoder (1993) 
examine the behavior of IV around merger and 
acquisition announcements finding that although the 
IV of target firms increases significantly three days 
before the announcement dates, there is no effect on 
the IV of the bidding firms. Donders and Vorst (1996) 
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study the change in IV surrounding scheduled news 
announcement days and find that IV increases as the 
event day approaches. After the news announcement, 
however, IV drops back to its long-run level over time. 
Chen and Clements (2007) explore the link between 
macroeconomic announcements and the behavior of 
IV. They find that IV for the S&P 500 falls on average 
by 2% on the day of Federal Open Market Committee 
meetings. Using standardized IV, Rogers et al. (2009) 
examine how management earnings forecast 
disclosures impact market uncertainty about firm value 
and find that such forecasts are associated with an 
increase in short-run market volatility, which is mainly 
attributable to “bad news” announcements and 
forecasts that are released more sporadically, and are 
thus less anticipated by investors. 
2.5 Sources of IT-Related Firm Risk  
In enterprise risk management, risk is defined as any 
possible event or circumstance that can have a negative 
influence on the enterprise (Enterprise Risk 
Management Committee, 2003). This stream of 
research uses expected loss, or conditional value at risk 
(CVaR) with its focus on losses that have serious 
economic consequences, as risk measures used to 
manage firm risks (Bai, Krishnan, Padman, & Wang, 
2013). Benaroch (2002) separates IT investment risks 
for firms into risk arising inside and outside the scope 
of software development. The former mainly refer to 
software development cost, and the latter primarily 
cover competitive risk and market risk. To the extent 
that option investors understand these risks, IV 
captures risk related to IT projects (e.g., system 
implementation risk, risk with business process 
redesign) and risk arising outside the scope of the IT 
project (e.g., change in competitive environment). 
Although numerous studies have shown that IT 
investments make significant positive contributions to 
firm performance and profitability (for a recent review, 
see Kohli & Grover, 2008 and Mithas, Tafti, Bardhan, 
& Goh, 2012), there is operational evidence supporting 
IT investments increasing or decreasing firm risk. IT 
has been shown to have intangible benefits, such as 
improved customer service, higher product and service 
quality, more efficient business processes, and better 
flexibility in coordination (Mukhopadyay, Rajiv, & 
Srinivasan, 1997; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000; S. G. 
Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, & Bendoly, 2007). Moreover, 
information sharing among supply chain partners 
facilitated by Internet-based interorganizational 
information systems (IOSs) reduces transaction 
uncertainty and mitigates demand shocks (Cachon & 
Fisher, 2000; Lee, So, & Tang, 2000). From the 
information processing perspective of the firm 
(Galbraith, 1974), IT improves coordination, providing 
information that enables firms to better and more 
quickly respond to unexpected challenges arising from 
business and competitive environments. This leads to 
less uncertainty about firms’ earnings volatility. 
Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski (1999) 
advocate Tobin’s q as a forward-looking measure for 
firm performance. As a variant of market-to-book, they 
argue that Tobin’s q provides a better reflection of IT’s 
true contribution to firms’ long-term performance 
potential, and find that IT investments are positively 
associated with Tobin’s q-value over the 1988-1993 
period. They also note that investments in IT also help 
firms avoid catastrophic losses resulting from liability 
suits, such as fraudulent or careless security handling 
and other environmental disasters. 
In contrast, IT investments may increase firm risk, and 
this increase may be due to sources similar to those 
proposed by Benaroch (2002). The first is IT project 
risk, including implementation risk, management risk, 
business process risk, etc. The fact is that the failure 
rate of IT projects is high (Iacovou & Dexter, 2005). 
These failures include failure to deliver a system, 
budget overruns, long delays, and organizational 
rejections. These failures are usually outcomes of 
cognitive limitations, management inattention, or 
mediocre skills to address observed problems 
(Lyytinen, Mathiassen, & Ropponen, 1998). 
Moreover, IT initiatives are difficult projects to 
manage, sometimes failing spectacularly, often falling 
short of management expectations, and sometimes 
succeeding spectacularly (Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 
1987; Kobelsky, Hunter, & Richardson, 2008). 
The second source of increased firm risk lies outside 
of the scope of a project—for example, competitive 
risk and user-perceived risk. In e-commerce, 
consumers may perceive online shopping for certain 
products risky and, if investors observe this, then this 
strengthens investor perceptions about IT investments 
as risky decisions made by firms (Agrawal et al., 
2003). Furthermore, if investors believe that a firm 
entering the online market will increase competition 
(e.g., trigger a price war), then this may increase risk 
for the firm. Using Information Week 500 data on IT 
spending from 1992 to 1997, Kobelsky et al. (2008) 
find evidence that IT investments increase the 
volatility of future earnings. Increased stock return 
volatility has also been identified in several other IS 
studies cited above. 
3 Method 
To illustrate one way that IVs can be used in research 
involving IT and firm risk, and how this compares to 
other approaches, we study three research questions 
relating IT announcements to firm risk. First, we 
examine the impact of IT announcements on firm risk 
using IVs and relate our results to other studies that use 
historical stock return volatility as a measure of firm 
risk. Second, we examine two dimensions proposed in 
earlier work to determine the conditions under which 
IT announcements have a greater or lesser effect on 
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firm risk: firm size and whether the announcement 
conveys good news or bad news. Third, we use the 
term structure of IVs to study whether IT 
announcements differ in the way they affect short- and 
long-term firm risk. The ability to distinguish between 
short-term firm risk and long-term firm risk is a unique 
benefit of using IVs. 
Methodologically, we adopt an event-study approach 
and measure the change in firm risk around the IT 
announcement dates for the full sample as well as for 
the subsamples by firm size and by news type. The idea 
is that when an IT investment announcement is made, 
investors evaluate the public information contained in 
the announcement and then readjust their beliefs about 
the expected value and uncertainty of the announcing 
firm. According to the semistrong version of the 
efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), investors’ 
beliefs about the expected value of a firm is 
immediately reflected in the prices of its traded 
securities. As a result, we expect to detect a significant 
change in IV around the announcement events if the 
investors indeed believe that IT announcements 
increase or decrease uncertainty about a firm’s future 
returns. 
3.1 Data 
To demonstrate the use of IV, we adopt a list of 640 
electronic commerce announcements from Dewan and 
Ren (2007). These data were collected from PR 
Newswire and BusinessWire in Lexis-Nexis from four 
distinct years: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Events that 
have confounding factors such as earnings 
announcements and lawsuits have already been 
eliminated from the list (see Dewan & Ren, 2007, p. 
378). In this list, each firm can have at most one 
announcement on any particular day but each firm can 
appear multiple times on the list as long as its 
announcements occur on different days. 
We use IVs derived from exchange-traded equity 
options as our measure for firm risk. The IV data were 
collected from the OptionMetrics database, where IV 
is derived from the hypothetical at-the-money-forward 
standardized options. Standardized options are built on 
a daily basis, to be at-the-money and of constant 
maturity, which reduces measurement errors that arise 
from using options that vary in duration and in the 
extent to which they are in-the-money (e.g., Dumas, 
Fleming, & Whaley, 1998; Hentschel, 2003; Rogers et 
al., 2009). Further information on the calculation of IV 
by OptionMetrics is available in the Technical 
Appendix. We collect IV data derived from both call 
and put standardized options for the announcing firm 
in each event from 10 days before to 10 days after the 
event; if the event day was a public holiday, we use the 
next trading day as the event day. To access both short- 
and long-term firm risk, we collect IV data for options 
with seven different expiration lengths: 30, 60, 91, 182, 
365, 547, and 730 calendar days. We further drop three 
events because we could not match the firms with the 
firm identifiers in OptionMetrics, which leaves 637 
announcements (68 announcements in 1996; 151 in 
1998; 215 in 2000;  and 203 in 2002). 
Because the design of IV stays the same across time, 
we can use the same IV measure for an event in 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002, and the construction remains the 
same to present (2018). In addition, there has been no 
structural change in how options markets operate. 
Financial measures, including IV from OptionMetrics, 
have been widely adopted by high-quality journals in 
finance, accounting, and business. Some recent 
publications that have used the same IV measure for 
periods subsequent to 2002 include Battalio and 
Schultz (2006); Rogers et al. (2009); Barraclough and 
Whaley (2012); and Hull and White (2017). 
In order to test if firm size plays a role in determining 
the change in firm risk, we collect the “number of 
employees (EMP)” variable from the Compustat North 
American database and match it with our options 
datasets. In addition, we calculate the abnormal returns 
for each event in order to determine if the event is a 
good or bad news event by collecting stock prices of 
the underlying firm from 10 days before to 10 days 
after each event from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (known as CRSP) database. The price 
data is also matched with our options datasets. 
3.1.1 Continuity Test   
We perform a “continuity test” on each of our seven 
raw datasets with different expiration lengths (i.e., 30, 
60, 91, 182, 365, 547, and 730 calendar days). The 
continuity test checks if the 11-day interval (i.e., [-5, 
5]—from five trading days before to five trading days 
after the event date) surrounding each event has 
sufficient valid IV data. An event is dropped if the 
announcing firm does not have traded options for the 
interval at all, or if two consecutive trading days in the 
11-day interval are more than four calendar days apart, 
or if the 11-day interval contains missing IV data for 
more than four trading days. Only events that satisfy 
such continuity tests are selected for our final sample. 
The purpose of the continuity tests is to further ensure 
that our results are not driven by unobserved factors 
that may have affected the market’s response to the IT 
events. Our final datasets are seven balanced panel 
datasets that contain IV for both call and put options, 
number of employees, and stock prices. Each event has 
a proper 11-day window surrounding the event date. 
The data used in our demonstration—IT 
announcements, IVs, stock prices, and firm size—are 
public information available to any researcher. 
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3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Measuring Changes in IV   
A stream of IS literature examines the short-run 
reactions of the stock market to IT investment 
announcements by measuring the changes in stock 
price and trading volume (e.g., Dos Santos, Peffers, & 
Mauer, 1993; Brynjolfsson & Yang, 1997; Im, Dow, & 
Grover, 2001; Subramani & Walden, 2001; Chatterjee, 
Pacini, & Sambamurthy, 2002; Dewan & Ren, 2007). 
Among these studies, the most common approach to 
calculate the abnormal return or abnormal volume is 
based on the deviation of an actual value from its 
“predicted” value. This predicted value is usually 
estimated from historical data. However, we do not use 
a historical data-based method to forecast IV because 
an IV is derived from current option prices. Thus, we 
follow a convention from the accounting literature 
(e.g., Sheikh, 1989; Rogers et al., 2009) and measure 
the change in IV surrounding the events as: 
∆𝐼𝑉𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡




𝑖 ) = 𝐼𝑛(𝐼𝑉𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡





Thus, the change in IV (∆IV ) is constructed as a log 
difference between IV from five days after the event 
(𝐼𝑉𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑖 )  and IV from five days before the event 
(𝐼𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑖 ), where i represents a particular event. The log 
transformation results in the distribution of IV 
becoming closer to Normal without losing its linear 
properties. We are able to examine the statistical 
significance of ∆IV using a one-sample t-statistic:  
∆𝐼𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑠𝑑(∆𝐼𝑉)/√𝑁
 ~𝑡(𝑁−1), (2) 
where ∆𝐼𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑉𝑖 , 𝑠𝑑(∆𝐼𝑉)𝑁𝑖=1  is the sample 
standard deviation across events, and N is the number 
of events. This one-sample t-test is based on the 
assumption that every observation of ∆ IVi is drawn 
from an independent normal distribution that governs 
the distribution of risk change for the underlying firm 
in event i. When ∆𝐼𝑉𝑖  is positive (negative) and 
statistically significant, there is evidence for an 
increase (decrease) in firm risk due to IT 
announcement i. In examining the changes in IV, our 
results are not driven by factors that remain constant 
before and after the events. Indeed, a key advantage of 
using IV to gauge event-induced firm risk is that IV is 
available daily. 
3.2.2 Multiple Regression on IV   
We use IV directly in a multiple regression framework, 
allowing us to model a further set of relationships and 
controls. To account for the impact of market volatility, 
we use the following regression model: 
𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑉𝑡
𝑖)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑉_𝑠𝑝500𝑡
𝑖 ) + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 _𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑉 _𝑠𝑝500𝑡





𝑖  + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚_𝑠𝑝500𝑡
𝑖  + 𝛽7𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑡
𝑖
+ 𝛽8𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑖 +  ∑𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ _𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠





𝑖 is the IV for the firm making announcement i on day 
t. IV_sp500 is the IV for the S&P500 index, which is our 
measure for market volatility. Post_Event is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the trading day is after the event 
date, and this is our fixed effect of interest. The 
interaction term Ln(IV_ 𝑠𝑝500𝑡
𝑖 ) ∗ Post_ 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑖 
captures the change in the association between firm-
level volatility and market volatility after the event—
that is, change in the expected systematic risk (Aharony 
et al. 1980). Besides market volatility, we include a 
number of control variables to make sure our results are 
not driven by these effects. NumEmpl is the number of 
employees as a measure of firm size. Prem is the 
interpolated premium for the firm-level options. 
Prem_sp500 is the premium for the S&P500 index 
options. Strike is the strike price agreed upon by the 
seller and buyer of an option at which the option can be 
exercised. Issue is an indicator that equals 1 (0) if the 
underlying security is an American depositary receipt 
(common stock). Exch_Dummies are the dummy 
variables for the security exchanges. Year_Dummies are 
the dummy variables for years when the announcements 
were made. Indus_Dummies are the dummy variables 
for the industry groups defined by the North American 
Industry Groups database from MorningStar, LLC. 
Our set of dummy/control variables in (3) are to help us 
ensure that our measurement of changes in firm risk 
after the IT announcements account for alternative 
explanations. Similar to the stock market, a main driver 
of any individual option volatility is market volatility. 
Therefore, the main purpose of (3) is to control for 
market volatility by including IV for the S&P500 index 
as an independent variable. Moreover, we include 
control variables such as premium and strike price to 
make sure that the change in market perception of firm 
risk is not driven by these effects. We also include 
dummy variables for security exchanges, years, and 
industries because changes in IV may be significant only 
when associated with a particular exchange, year, or 
industry (thus not attributable to IT announcements) and 
we need to control for this possibility. 




4.1 Descriptive Results 
A description of our final seven datasets (i.e., 
expiration lengths 30, 60, 91, 182, 365, 547, and 730 
calendar days respectively) is presented in Table 1. We 
describe call and put options separately because they 
have different IV. The number of qualified events for 
each expiration length is less than 637 because some 
events do not pass our continuity tests and are dropped. 
The number of qualified events is 428 for expiration 
lengths 30, 60, 91, and decreases monotonically as 
expiration length becomes longer, to 179 events for the 
length of 730 days. This decrease in the number of 
events shows that, in general, fewer investors trade 
long-term options because it is harder to gauge long-
run firm risk. 
The mean value of IV ranges from 0.640 (call) and 
0.648 (put) to 0.484 (call) and 0.491 (put), and 
generally diminishes as expiration lengths get longer. 
In contrast, the average number of employees increases 
for firms with longer expiration-length options. The 
stock return for each event is calculated as the mean 
return for the underlying firm over the [-5, 5] day 
window. We report the average stock return across 
events for each dataset, which is consistently close to 
zero. We also calculate the proportion of negative log 
ratios (i.e., ln(IVpost/IVpre)) across the events for each 
option type in each dataset. This proportion is 
consistently around 0.55 for all our datasets, which 
suggests that about half of the qualified events in our 
samples are associated with a decrease in IV. Under the 
assumption that the log ratio for the underlying firm in 
every event follows an independent normal 
distribution, we explore if the mean of these 
distributions is statistically different from zero. We 
relax this assumption somewhat when we examine the 
matched sample described later. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 




Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Call 
 30 428 0.640 0.329 41.726 87.089 0.000 0.058 0.533 
60 428 0.628 0.319 41.729 87.178 0.000 0.058 0.544 
91 428 0.612 0.306 41.986 87.387 0.000 0.056 0.584 
182 318 0.556 0.256 53.109 97.877 0.000 0.049 0.541 
365 210 0.486 0.184 70.842 112.472 0.001 0.041 0.567 
547 209 0.484 0.175 70.348 112.808 0.001 0.041 0.541 
730 179 0.488 0.167 69.280 122.118 0.001 0.044 0.564 
Put 
 30 428 0.648 0.324 41.726 87.089 0.000 0.058 0.526 
60 428 0.635 0.315 41.729 87.178 0.000 0.058 0.509 
91 428 0.619 0.301 41.986 87.387 0.000 0.056 0.528 
182 318 0.566 0.263 53.109 97.877 0.000 0.049 0.535 
365 210 0.493 0.192 70.842 112.472 0.001 0.041 0.533 
547 209 0.491 0.186 70.348 112.808 0.001 0.041 0.522 
730 179 0.493 0.182 69.280 122.118 0.001 0.044 0.564 
Notes: All summary statistics are based on our final datasets that passed the continuity test, so the number of events is always less than 637. The 
continuity test is to make sure that each event has a proper estimation window (i.e., 5 days before and 5 days after the event), for details please see 
the Research Design section. IV is the average implied volatility across estimation windows and across events. Number of employees is the average 
number of employees (in thousands) across the underlying firms of the events. Stock return is the average stock return across estimation windows 
(i.e., [-5,5]) and across events. ∆IV = ln (IV_post / IV_pre). IV_pre = implied volatility from five trading days before the event. IV_post = implied 
volatility from five trading days after the event. 
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4.2 Empirical Results 
We execute the analysis for each of our final seven 
datasets. The longer expiration options are necessary 
because investment in IT may take years to add value 
to a firm (Bharadwaj et al., 1999). Assuming option 
market investors understand this, they would make 
adjustments to their beliefs about long-run firm risk 
compared to short-run risk. To make sure that our 
results are robust and not driven by unique factors 
about put or call options alone, we calculate the log 
ratios using IVs derived from both put and call options. 
4.2.1 Changes in IV 
We present our baseline evidence on IV changes 
around IT announcements in Table 2. The log ratios of 
IV from (1) are presented in Column 3 and Column 4, 
and the corresponding mean percentage change in 
Column 5 and Column 6. Overall, there are statistically 
significant increases in IV around the announcement 
dates (except for call options with the 547-day 
expiration length). The put and call options generate 
similar results. We note that even though a majority of 
the samples are associated with a decrease in IV from 
Table 1, the significance of the results in Table 2 also 
depends on the size and spread of change in IV. The 
change in IV is greater for shorter-term options, and 
gradually declines as the term gets longer. For call 
options IV, the increase is greater than 2.0% for the 
expirations of 91 days and less; for put options IV, the 
increase is greater than 2.0% for expirations of 182 
days and less. Our results indicate that IT 
announcements increase ex ante firm risk, especially in 
the short-term. This suggests that despite all the 
potential benefits from IT, investors view IT 
capabilities as risky assets to build and manage (Wang 
& Alam, 2007). 
To ensure that the significance of our baseline evidence 
does not depend on the distribution of our IV changes 
around IT announcements, or on the number of days 
pre- and post-event, we follow Donders and Vorst 
(1996) and apply a non-parametric Wilcoxon test to 
our event sample of 30-day call options. The results are 
presented in Table 3. In the first row with relative days 
equal to 10, we compare the average IV over 10 days 
before the event to the average IV over 10 days after 
the event (including the event day). N+ (N-) gives the 
number of events for which the post-event average IV 
is higher (lower or equal). 
 
Table 2. Base Results 
Expiration length # of Events ln (IV_post / IV_pre) Mean percentage change 
  Call Put Call Put 



































Notes: Each expiration time length represents the group of standardized options that would expire in the exact number 
of calendar days. Number of events is the total number of events that passed our continuity test. The log ratio and t-
statistics are calculated at the event level. IV_pre = implied volatility from five trading days before the event. IV_post 
= implied volatility from five trading days after the event. Mean percentage change is the mean of (IV_post – IV_pre) 
/ IV_pre. t-statistic is presented in the brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
Measuring Risk from IT Initiatives  
 
1576 
Median percentage change gives the relative change in 
IV after the events. The Wilcoxon column reports the 
Wilcoxon single-rank statistics, and we are able to 
reject the null hypothesis that the IT announcements 
have no effect on IV comparing up to 10 trading days 
before and after the events. We fail to reject this null 
hypothesis when comparing the event day with the 
previous trading day, which indicates there may be 
information leakage before announcements, or it could 
take time for investors to absorb the information 
conveyed by announcements. We performed the same 
Wilcoxon test on both put and call options for all 
expiration lengths. Our results reported in Tables 1 and 
2 hold except that for the 730-day options, the 
difference between IVs before and after the event is not 
significant within three trading days before and after 
the event, suggesting that it may take investors more 
time to absorb the information conveyed in the event 
for these longer-term options. Overall, we confirm that 
there are significant increases in IV immediately after 
IT announcements. 
 
Table 3. Wilcoxon Tests 




10 428 235 193 1.40% -3.45*** 
     (0.001) 
9 428 236 192 1.20% -3.30*** 
     (0.001) 
8 428 234 194 1.80% -3.315*** 
     (0.001) 
7 428 230 198 1.93% -3.09*** 
     (0.002) 
6 428 232 196 1.70% -2.92*** 
     (0.004) 
5 428 235 193 2.40% -2.78*** 
     (0.006) 
4 428 241 187 3.17% -3.01*** 
     (0.003) 
3 428 234 194 2.40% -3.01*** 
     (0.003) 
2 428 238 190 1.08% -3.32*** 
     (0.001) 
1 428 225 203 1.33% -1.42 
  (0.156) 
Notes: Results based on 30-day call options. N+: average post-event IV > average pre-event IV (post-event period 
includes the event day). Median%Change: (post - pre)/pre. Wilcoxon: Wilcoxon single-rank statistic, p-values 
reported in the parentheses. H0: The IT announcements have no effect on IV. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively.  
 
4.2.2 Regression Using IV 
To account for the impact of market volatility on firm-
level volatility, we construct a panel dataset covering 
120 trading days before and after each of the 428 
events that passed our continuity test for 30-day call 
options. We then estimate our extended market model 
in (3) using a set of hierarchical regressions including 
OLS (ordinary least squares) and FGLS (feasible 
generalized least squares). Using the log of firm-level 
IV as the dependent variable, our independent 
variables include (the log of) IV derived from SP500 
index (i.e., market volatility), a post-event dummy 
variable that equals 1 if on or after the event date, 
otherwise 0, and the interaction of these two main 
effects. The other control variables are detailed in (3) 
and we adjust for heteroscedasticity and panel-specific 
autocorrelation in our FGLS regressions. 
Table 4 presents the regression results. We consistently 
find significant increases in firm-level IV after the 
announcements, controlling for market-level IV. 
Specifically, our results from the OLS regression with 
robust standard errors (Column 3 in Table 4) show that 
post-event IV is, on average, 9.4% higher than pre-
event IV (over a 120-day window). In addition, the 
interaction term is significant, indicating the 
systematic risk also increases for the firms after they 
make the e-commerce announcements. 
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Table 4. Regression Controlling for Market Volatility 
Variables OLS OLS 
(Robust SE) 
FGLS 























































Exch_Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Year_Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Indus_Dummies  Yes  Yes 
N 103140  97299 92256 
Notes: FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least Squares) regressions are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and panel-specific 
autocorrelation. Coefficients on the dummies variables are suppressed for brevity. Standard errors are provided in the 
brackets. Significance level: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10. 
We note that our continuity test only applies to the 11-
day interval, for all expiration lengths. The purpose 
again is to ensure that there are no unobserved 
confounding factors during the event windows. We do 
not do the same continuity test for the 241-day period, 
which extends to 120 trading days before and after the 
event. The reason is that if we apply the same 
continuity test, then we would often have zero 
acceptance: none of the 241-day periods would survive 
the test because firm-level options may not be actively 
traded on every trading day (especially for longer-term 
options). However, for the dataset used in our 
regression, we apply a relaxed version of the continuity 
test on the 241-day periods, such that every 241-day 
period belongs to the same announcing firm and should 
have less than 15% missing values for IV. 
4.2.3 Short- vs. Long-Term Firm Risk 
A critical advantage of IV as a measure of firm risk is 
the term structure of IVs: IVs are available for options 
with different expiration lengths. Based on Table 2, it 
is easily seen  that as the expiration length grows, the 
magnitude and significance of the increase in firm risk 
from IT announcements diminishes. Thus, one could 
conclude that firms with traded options that have 
longer expiration lengths have lesser increases in risk 
caused by IT announcements. However, in our dataset, 
events are pooled by option expiration length, and in 
examining the number of events in Table 2, it is clear 
that the number of events fall substantially for options 
with more than 91 days to expiration. 
To study the effects of term structure in more depth, 
we reduced the sample of events to those for firms that 
had traded options for each expiration length, 
effectively matching the firms/events in the sample 
across the option expiration lengths. This resulted in 
179 events—thus, 179 of the original 428 events were 
for firms that had traded options for every expiration 
length we study. For the original 428 events, all firms 
had traded options for the 30-60-91 expirations 
lengths, and most had traded options for 182 days. We 
then ran the analysis using the change in IV on the 
reduced sample of 179 events and on the full sample, 
with the 179 events excluded. Results are presented in 
Table 5. For firms that traded options in all expiration 
lengths—up to 2 years—there is no increase in risk 
from IT announcements. In contrast, for firms with 
traded options of 182 days or less, there is a substantial 
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and significant increase in firm risk from IT 
announcements. 
We conclude that IT announcements do not increase 
firm risk for firms that trade options with longer 
expiration lengths, and conjecture that these firms may 
be larger and thus have more stable returns over time. 
However, for firms with only traded options of shorter 
expiration lengths, the increase in firm risk from IT 
announcements is high. We note that this analysis and 
result from IT announcements could not be obtained 
with other measures of firm risk, demonstrating a clear 
advantage of IV. 
4.2.4 Effect of Firm Size (Number of 
Employees) 
As IVs are firm- and option length-specific, we show 
how it is possible to subset firms by different 
dimensions, such as size, and continue to use IV as a 
measure of firm risk. Compared to larger firms, smaller 
firms are less experienced with handling IT investment 
projects, and a greater proportion of the activities of a 
smaller firm are usually affected by IT projects. Thus, 
smaller firms are exposed to more fundamental 
challenges from IT projects. Moreover, spending on IT 
projects usually accounts for a larger proportion of the 
overall budget for smaller firms, thus exposing smaller 
firms to greater risks from project failures. In addition, 
IT announcements made by smaller firms may contain 
more new information about firm earnings than for 
larger firms, making such announcements more likely 
to surprise investors (Bamber, 1986; Wang, 1994; Im 
et al., 2001). 
 
Table 5. Short vs. Long Term 
Expiration 
length 
# of Events ln (IV_post/IV_pre) Mean percentage change 
 
 Call Put Call Put 
Short term 





















30 179 -0.005 
(-0.34) 
0.001   
60 179 0.005 
(0.42) 
0.011   
91 179 0.006 
(0.64) 
0.008   
182 179 0.008 
(1.03) 
0.012   
365 179 0.007 
(1.47) 
0.009   
547 179 0.005 
(1.05) 
0.008*   
730 179 0.008* 
(1.68) 
0.010**   
Notes: Events under Short term are those that pass our continuity test, excluding the 179 events that have 730-day 
options traded before and after the events. The 179 events under Long term are those that pass our continuity test, 
and have 730-day options traded before and after the events. Mean percentage change is the mean of (IV_post – 
IV_pre)/IV_pre t-statistic is presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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We divide our full sample of 637 events at the 60th 
percentile value of the number of employees. We 
choose the 60th percentile value (i.e., 15,500 
employees) as the threshold because the continuity test 
drops more events belonging to smaller firms. By 
including slightly more firms in the “small” group we 
ensure a better-balanced sample size between the 
“small” and “large” subsamples after the continuity 
test. Notice that our division of “small” and “large” 
subsamples is only relative; many “small” firms really 
are not that small based on the number of employees. 
We present our results in Table 6. The log ratios are 
reported in Column 4 and Column 5, and their t-
statistics in Column 6 and Column 7. We find 
statistically significant changes in IV around the event 
days for the “small” firm subsamples, except for call 
options with longer times to expiration: 365 or 547 
days. However, the “large” firm subsamples have no 
significant changes in IV around the event days. This 
finding suggests that IT announcement events 
substantially affect uncertainty about the underlying 
firm value for smaller firms. In addition, the log ratios 
for the smaller firm subsample are much greater than 
those in our baseline results table (Table 2), indicating 
that the overall results are, in part, driven by the 
smaller firms. We thus conclude that because larger 
firms are likely to be those with traded options across 
expirations lengths, IT announcements do not increase 
firm risk for those firms. In order to test if our results 
are robust to different thresholds of firm size, we 
divide our full sample into “small” and “large” 
subsamples at 6,580, the 50th percentile value of 
number of employees. Our qualitative findings do not 
change. 
We also examine whether our results are robust to 
different measures of firm size such as total assets and 
total market capitalization, using a similar approach of 
dividing our sample into small and large firms. Results 
from using these different measures of firm size are 
qualitatively consistent with those presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Results by Firm Size 
Expiration 
length 
Firm size # of Events ln (IV_post/IV_pre) t-statistic 
Call Put Call Put 
30 Small 220 0.026*** 0.032*** 2.85 3.50 
Large 208 -0.003 -0.003 -0.22 -0.28 
60 Small 220 0.018** 0.023*** 2.38 3.02 
Large 208 0.004 0.006 0.37 0.70 
91 Small 220 0.021*** 0.024*** 3.02 3.59 
Large 208 0.003 0.007 0.32 0.82 
182 Small 127 0.016** 0.023*** 2.45 3.82 
Large 191 0.003 0.007 0.39 1.06 
365 Small 44 0.011 0.013** 1.32 2.16 
Large 166 0.003 0.004 0.55 0.86 
547 Small 45 0.007 0.015** 0.94 2.34 
Large 164 0.002 0.003 0.46 0.73 
730 Small 54 0.015* 0.023*** 1.70 2.80 
Large 125 0.002 0.001 0.32 0.23 
Notes: Small: Number of employees < 15.5 (in thousands), 60th percentile across all firms. Large: Number of 
employees > 15.5 (in thousands), 60th percentile across all firms. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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4.2.5 Effect of News Type 
In examining the effect of news type—good news or 
bad news, as defined earlier—we show how IV can be 
used with other firm-specific market data. Controlling 
for news type, even though it is determined ex post, 
allows us to control the role of returns on firm risk. 
We examine the two types of news separately because 
prior literature suggests that changes in volatilities 
around information releases may be asymmetric 
(Black, 1976; Campbell & Hentschel, 1992; Skinner, 
1994; Kothari et al., 2009; Rogers et al., 2009). First, 
good-news IT announcements mean that investors 
believe that the information conveyed in the 
announcement is “better” than they expected, thus 
giving them more confidence about the firm’s future 
returns. However, bad-news IT announcements 
surprise investors in a negative way, thus creating 
more doubt about future firm returns. Second, Skinner 
(1994) suggests that in order to preempt big surprises, 
managers voluntarily disclose bad news early when 
they know that current period earnings news is 
adverse. Similarly, when managers have insider 
information about their IT projects that investors may 
consider to be adverse news, they may choose to 
announce it early in order to preempt surprises later. 
Assuming that investors understand this, they may 
expect future bad news events related to the same 
project and adjust their beliefs about future volatility 
of the firm accordingly. Thus, we expect IT 
announcements that convey bad news to increase firm 
risk and those that convey good news to decrease firm 
risk. Moreover, Skinner (1994) suggests that investors 
react more strongly to early bad-news disclosures than 
to good-news disclosures and argues that this would be 
partially reflected in greater variation in investors’ 
expectations for future stock prices. 
We follow a modified method from Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay (1996) in order to divide the full sample of 
events into “good news” and “bad news” subsamples. 
Specifically, we categorize each announcement using 
the deviation of the actual stock return from the 
expected stock return on the announcement day. The 
calculation largely follows a standard abnormal returns 
model (Dos Santos et al., 1993; Dewan & Ren, 2007) 
and we use a standard market model to predict the 
expected return. If the actual stock return exceeds 
expected returns (i.e., the abnormal return is positive), 
then the announcement is designated as good news, 
otherwise the announcement is designated as bad 
news. Among our 637 announcements, we identify 312 
as  good news and the remaining 325 as bad news. 
 
 
Table 7. Results by News Type 
Expiration 
length 
News type # of Events ln (IV_post / IV_pre) t-statistic 
Call Put Call Put 
30 Good news 218 0.005 0.006 0.45 0.62 
Bad news 210 0.031*** 0.029** 2.76 2.53 
60 Good news 218 0.007 0.010 0.75 1.20 
Bad news 210 0.026*** 0.028*** 2.85 2.94 
91 Good news 218 0.006 0.009 0.80 1.22 
Bad news 210 0.027*** 0.030*** 3.50 3.63 
182 Good news 167 0.004 0.006 0.59 0.95 
Bad news 151 0.021*** 0.028*** 2.79 3.87 
365 Good news 117 0.005 0.004 0.88 0.74 
Bad news 93 0.015** 0.018*** 2.06 3.01 
547 Good news 117 0.001 0.002 0.20 0.38 
Bad news 92 0.013* 0.019*** 1.98 3.34 
730 Good news 101 0.001 0.002 0.12 0.29 
Bad news 78 0.016** 0.019*** 2.43 3.59 
Notes: Good news = SAR (stock abnormal return) > 0. Bad news = SAR (stock abnormal return) < 0. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7 reports the results for the two subsamples. The 
log ratios are reported in Column 4 and Column 5, and 
their t-statistics in Column 6 and Column 7. There is 
consistent evidence that bad-news IT announcements 
significantly increases firm risk both in the short- and 
long-term and that good news has no effect on firm 
risk. It again shows that investors view new IT 
capabilities as risky assets for firms: investors’ 
expectations of the volatility of returns for the 
underlying stock substantially increases after the bad-
news announcements. Moreover, investors respond 
with caution to good-news IT announcements: there is 
no significant change in IV around these events, which 
is likely because good news is less surprising than bad 
news given managers’ incentives to report good news 
and hide bad news. We also find that the magnitude of 
volatility change tends to be greater for shorter 
expiration lengths (i.e., the average log ratios for 
expiration lengths of 30, 60 and 91 days for the bad-
news subset are 2.8% [call] and 2.9% [put]; the average 
log ratios for expiration lengths of 365, 547, and 730 
days for the bad-news subset are 1.5% [call] and 1.9% 
[put]). 
If the abnormal return of an IT announcement is close 
to zero, it may be “neglected” by investors and thus 
have no effect on firm risk. To examine this, we further 
categorize an announcement as good news only if the 
actual return exceeds the expected return by more than 
5.0% and categorize it as bad news if the actual return 
is more than 5.0% less than the expected return. The 
remaining announcements are designated as no news. 
Of our 637 announcements, we categorize 73 as good 
news, 75 as bad news, and the remaining 485 as no 
news. We find the results to be highly significant 
across all expirations for the bad- news events, not 
significant for the good-news events, and rarely 
significant for the no-news events. 
Given the Skinner analysis (Skinner, 1994) that 
managers may decide to make announcements early if 
current period earnings are adverse, then 
announcement events related to earnings in the case of 
bad news may be endogenously determined, as 
suggested by Viswanathan and Wei (2008). However, 
as we examine IVs pre- and post-event rather than 
earnings or returns, our analysis is not directly affected 
by this endogeneity so long as earnings or returns are 
not directly related to IVs. 
4.3 Robustness of IV vs. Historical 
Volatility 
IVs may be sensitive to the time it takes for new 
information to be incorporated into option prices. To 
examine whether our analyses are sensitive to the 
length of interval that centers on the event dates, we 
reran all of our analyses using IV from three trading 
days before and after the event dates, all our qualitative 
findings remain unchanged. We do not suggest using 
one trading day before and after the event, because new 
information may be leaked to the public just before the 
event date and some investors may take longer than a 
day to absorb the information conveyed by the IT 
announcements. 
One advantage of IV over historical stock return 
volatility is that IV can be measured on a daily basis 
and can thus capture the changes in firm risk over  short 
time intervals  around the IT events. Our dataset allows 
us to explore the difference between IV and actual 
volatility for options with an expiration length of up to 
91 days. Table 8 presents the mean difference between 
IV for the fifth day after the events and historical 
volatility over a period starting on the fifth post-event 
day. Our results show that actual volatility is 
significantly greater in magnitude than IV for all 
durations. This is because actual volatility over, say 30 
days, could be influenced by all events happening in 
the same 30 days, whereas IV represents investors’ 
expectation of volatility, given their knowledge today, 
over the next 30 days. We can safely assume that 
changes in IV right before and after events are driven 
by the events themselves. However, changes in 
historical volatility over, say 30 days before and after 
the events, could be affected by confounding factors in 
the two 30-day windows. 
 
Table 8. Comparison Between IV and Actual Volatility 
Expiration length Call Put 
Mean ∆ t-statistic Mean ∆ t-statistic 
30 -3.50*** -8.39 -3.49*** -8.35 
60 -4.99*** -9.97 -4.98*** -9.96 
91 -5.58*** -11.93 -5.53*** -11.88 
Notes: Mean ∆ = Mean of (IV – actual) across the events. IV = implied volatility on the fifth trading day after the 
event. Actual = realized price volatility over 30/60/91 days after the fifth post-event trading day. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This research introduces an important and 
underrecognized measure of firm risk that can be used 
to assess the impact of firm-level IT investments. The 
measure, implied volatility (IV), is obtained from the 
price of a stock option traded on the option exchange. 
Advantages of IV as a measure of firm risk from IT 
initiatives include: IV is based on traders’ expectations 
of future stock return volatility that represents 
volatility of future earning, it is forward looking in 
contrast to historical stock volatility, and firms have 
options with different expiration dates providing a 
term structure of IVs to measure firm risk. 
After reviewing the literature on the effects of IT on 
firm risk, we show how changes in IV can be set up for 
testing and how regressions on IV can be formulated 
using methods from accounting and finance. We then 
demonstrate how these methods are implemented in 
practice using a dataset from previously published 
research. 
In the process we also provide a set of findings—some 
of them novel because of our ability to exploit IVs. 
First, IT announcements significantly increase firm 
risk between 1% and 3%, depending on the expiration 
length of the option. Second, the term structure of 
traded options separated those firms that have 
increased risk as a result of IT announcements: firms 
with traded options with expiration lengths of 182 days 
or less have increased firm risk as a result of IT 
announcements, and the increase in risk is on the order 
of 2% to 4%. In contrast, firms that have traded options 
across expiration lengths of up to two years do not have 
changes in firm risk as a result of IT announcements.  
Third, firm size is negatively associated with IT 
announcements’ impact on firm risk. In particular, IT 
announcements made by smaller firms significantly 
increase firm risk, likely because smaller firms are 
more subject to changes brought about by new IT 
initiatives. Fourth, we find that bad-news IT 
announcements are associated with significantly 
higher firm risk, whereas good-news IT 
announcements have no effect. This may be because 
bad-news announcements are more surprising to 
investors and may reinforce impressions about the 
riskiness of new IT investments. Finally, we find that 
IVs show significantly less risk than the actual 
volatility in stock prices after the event day,  which 
indicates the degree that other events affect stock 
volatility and suggests that use of historical stock 
volatility to predict risk from IT announcements is 
compromised by other events that may be challenging 
to account for. 
To demonstrate the economic significance of our 
findings, we use  call options with 30 days to expiration 
as our example. We find that IV increases by about 3% 
on average after events (see Table 2). This means that, 
on average, the IV jumped from 0.64 (mean IV for 30-
day call options in our sample) to about 0.66. We then 
calculate how much the price of a call option changes 
if the underlying stock volatility increases by 3%. 
Specifically, we assume a typical at-the-money call 
option with a $30 stock price, a 5% risk-free rate, and 
a volatility increase from 0.64 to 0.66. Using the 
Black-Scholes model, we find that the value of the call 
option increases from 2.25 to 2.32—a roughly 3.1% 
increase. A 3% change in firm risk, as well as in option 
price, is rather significant for a large firm as result of a 
single IT initiative. The magnitude of our results is 
consistent with prior research findings in top journals. 
For example, Rogers et al (2009) report a 1% to 4% 
increase in IV around management earnings forecasts. 
Patell and Wolfson (1981) report that IV increases by 
about 4% for 30-day options. We also calculate the 
average percentage change in VIX (IV for the S&P 500 
Index) over an 11-day window from 2004 to 2018, 
which is around 1.7%. 
The availability of a measure like IV within a few days 
of the announcement of an IT initiative has managerial 
implications; it is possible for management to observe 
the market’s assessment of how the initiative may 
impact firm risk. Together with cumulative managerial 
experience, such information can be useful for 
managerial oversight. If management perceives the 
risk of an IT initiative differently from what the market 
yields as changes in IV, then this difference can be 
identified, explained, and possibly controlled. For 
example, management could review and revise their 
internal risk assessments, provide more detailed 
explanation to the market in a follow-up 
announcement, devote more resources to an IT project 
as a way of neutralizing the potential increase in risk, 
and change the schedule of development and 
implementation so as to lessen the risk over time. In 
this way, a change in IV complements other risk 
assessments. 
Prior research finds that IT investment announcements 
tend to be associated with positive abnormal returns 
(Dos Santos et al 1993, Dewan and Ren 2007). Our 
findings show that, even though firms may expect 
positive abnormal returns, managers need to balance 
the gain in the short-run firm value versus higher 
volatility of future returns in making a strategic 
decision about an e-commerce announcement. One 
future research direction is to explore the risk effects 
of IT investments in more state-of-the-art technologies 
such as artificial intelligence. The findings of such 
research could help managers develop strategies to, for 
example, reduce firm risk by strategically making IT 
announcements. 
One limitation of our study is the age of our IT events. 
Our events were e-commerce announcements 
collected from the 1996-2002 period, which is about 
20 years ago, and our specific results for e-commerce 
announcements may differ for announcements about 
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current IT initiatives such as data analytics and cloud 
computing. However, the advantages we present about 
IV as a measure that can be used to determine how firm 
risk is impacted by IT-related investments do not fade 
over time. That is, our methods showing that IV is a 
robust and informative measure of IT-induced risk 
should persist. We suggest that future studies 
examining the relationship between firm risk and IT 
investments should be held to this metric. We 
recognize that our method is restricted to publicly 
available firms. IT announcements might be available 
for privately held firms, but if they are not publicly 
traded, the IV and other data are not available. A 
limitation to our market-based (returns) classification 
of events into good and bad news is that the 
classification is ex post. Future work could compare a 
content analysis classification with a market-based 
one, which could be a contribution to the literature on 
its own. 
A theoretical implication of our approach is that IVs 
represent a market version of crowdsourcing, such that 
they represent risk based on accumulated information 
about the firm and IT initiatives. IVs connect firm risk 
to IT risk in a forward-looking manner, rather than 
retrospectively, and have the further advantage of a 
term structure. If conducting an event study, then the 
method requires a set of events, such as IT 
announcements and IVs for a certain number of days 
around the IT announcements. For instance, we 
measure the impact of firm risk by the log ratio of IV 
from five trading days after the event date to IV from 
five trading days before the event date. Other useful 
publicly available data that can be used to perform 
robustness tests include the S&P500 index, number of 
employees for each firm, and stock prices around the 
event date to determine if the announcement is bad, 
good, or no news. In this way, IVs can be used as a 
measure of firm risk across a variety of different 
studies examining IT initiatives. 
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Technical Appendix for Implied Volatility 
Implied volatility (IV) can be determined using an option pricing model such as the Black-Scholes model and the 
binomial model. The IV measure used by OptionMetrics is obtained by using the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) 
binomial tree model, which has become an industry standard for American options because it allows the valuation of 
options before their expiration. Below we provide a concise technical note on the calculation of standardized IV that 
we use as our measure of firm risk. 
The CRR model assumes there are N subperiods between now the option expiration date, and the security price can 
either move “up” or “down” during each subperiod. Therefore, we can build a tree starting from now (time 0) with 
security price S. Since S can only move up or down during the first subperiod, there will be two possible prices for this 
security by the end of the first subperiod: Su (price up) and Sd (price down). If we keep expanding the tree until option 
expiration, we can build a binomial tree where the option price at expiration (end of the tree) is calculated by setting 
the option expiration value equal to the exercise value. We can then work backwards to calculate the price of the option 
at time 0. Specifically, the price of a call option at the beginning of the a subperiod is given by 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {
[𝑝𝐶𝑖+1
𝑢𝑝
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝐶𝑖+1
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛]
𝑅, 𝑆𝑖 − 𝐾
}, (4) 
where 𝐶𝑖 is the price of a call option at the beginning of subperiod i, 𝐶𝑖+1
𝑢𝑝
and 𝐶𝑖+1
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛are two possible option prices at 
the end of the subperiod, p is the risk-neutral probability, r is the interest rate, h is the size of the subperiod, q is the 
continuous dividend yield, K is the strike price of the option, and S is the current price for the underlying security, 
which is a function of σ - implied volatility as well as Si−1 and h. The calculation of the price of a put option is likewise. 
To get the value for IV (σ), the model is run iteratively with different values of σ until the calculated price of the option 
at time 0 converges to its market price. Next, the standardized IV are calculated using a kernel smoothing technique. 
Specifically, a kernel smoother is used to generate a “volatility surface,” where a smoothed volatility, ?̂?, is calculated 









where ?̂?𝑖 is the smoothed volatility for grid point j on the volatility surface, i is indexed over all the options for that 
day, Vi is the vega of the option, σ is the implied volatility, and Φ(.) is the kernel function. The firm risk measure that 
we use in this paper, the standardized, at-the-money-forward IV, is then calculated by interpolating the volatility 
surface points to the forward price and the target expiration. 
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